A Do Not Touch list is a boycott and divestment screen, not a sanctions list. It names parties that no government has yet designated, but that this project’s research found sufficiently documented to warrant exclusion from portfolios, procurement and correspondent relationships while formal designation catches up. The model is Section 202 of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act (CISADA), the federal statute that created the “scrutinized companies” category, and the state-level pension and procurement divestment statutes built on it: all of them trigger on documented conduct, not on a Treasury listing, because the two move at different speeds.
Two groups make up this screen. Twenty-five parties already sit on the Commerce Department’s BIS Entity List for the same conduct that would support an OFAC designation, and have not yet been added to it: the BIS-OFAC gap. Forty-three more are seeds developed from this project’s own entity investigations: documented links to the crackdown and sanctions-evasion apparatus that meet both gates of the evidentiary standard set out below.
68Names on the published screenEntered on the list August 10, 2026. This is the first publication of the screen.
25BIS–OFAC gap partiesOn Commerce’s Entity List with a Federal Register citation; not matched onto Treasury’s SDN list.
43Gated seedsDeveloped from this project’s entity investigations and cleared under both gates.
Both gates, strictest wins
Gate 1: undesignated. A five-list re-screen across the US, EU, UK, Canada and Australia sanctions regimes must confirm the party carries no existing designation under any name variant.
Gate 2: tier standard. The supporting evidence must rest on a Tier 1 to 4 source. Secondary corroboration, commercial-intelligence and aggregator-only evidence fails this gate regardless of how it fares on Gate 1.
Removals. 10 names that an earlier verification pass had flagged were removed from this screen after the Phase 3 gate found each one already designated by at least one tracked jurisdiction under its official name; a corrected classification, not a clearance. Consistent with the both-gates rule, they are not named here; only the count is reported.
Register A · BIS-OFAC Gap (25)
Parties already on Commerce’s Entity List, with a Federal Register citation, that have not been matched onto Treasury’s SDN list.
Showing 25 of 25 entries
| Name | Jurisdiction | BIS Action | Documented Conduct | The Ask |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Arrow China Electronics Trading Co., Ltd.Entered August 10, 2026 | China | BIS Entity List addition; Federal Register 90 FR, Doc. 2025-19508, eff./publ. October 9, 2025 | Provided/attempted to provide support to procurement networks supplying U.S.-origin electronic components later found in weaponized UAVs operated by Iranian proxies (incl. Houthi militants); network tied to Iran MODAFL-controlled Shiraz Electronics Industries (SEI, existing OFAC SDN) and to the network of sanctioned individual Emily Liu, provided critical facilitation for agent organization "YL" to obtain U.S.-made electronic components later found in weaponized UAV systems | OFAC SDN designation review (E.O. 13224/13382); BIS Entity List restricts future exports only, no asset freeze |
| Arrow Electronics (Hong Kong) Co., Ltd.Entered August 10, 2026 | Hong Kong/China | BIS Entity List addition; Federal Register 90 FR, Doc. 2025-19508, eff./publ. October 9, 2025 | Provided/attempted to provide support to procurement networks supplying U.S.-origin electronic components later found in weaponized UAVs operated by Iranian proxies (incl. Houthi militants); network tied to Iran MODAFL-controlled Shiraz Electronics Industries (SEI, existing OFAC SDN) and to the network of sanctioned individual Emily Liu, Hong Kong affiliate of the same network; parent Arrow Electronics, Inc. is NYSE-listed (flag for extra diligence) | OFAC SDN designation review (E.O. 13224/13382); BIS Entity List restricts future exports only, no asset freeze |
| Atadoruk Havacilik Savunma Sanayi Ticaret Ltd. Şti.Entered August 10, 2026 | Turkey | BIS Entity List addition; Federal Register 90 FR, Doc. 2025-19508, eff./publ. October 9, 2025 | Diverted U.S.-origin items to Iran, including items classified under ECCN 2B350 (chemical-manufacturing equipment, Australia Group proliferation-risk control); several linked to transshipping components for Iran's HESA aerospace/defense concern or to parties already on the BIS Entity List/OFAC SDN list | OFAC SDN designation review (E.O. 13224/13382); BIS Entity List restricts future exports only, no asset freeze |
| Beijing Kevins Technology Development Co., Ltd.Entered August 10, 2026 | China | BIS Entity List addition; Federal Register 90 FR, Doc. 2025-19508, eff./publ. October 9, 2025 | Provided/attempted to provide support to procurement networks supplying U.S.-origin electronic components later found in weaponized UAVs operated by Iranian proxies (incl. Houthi militants); network tied to Iran MODAFL-controlled Shiraz Electronics Industries (SEI, existing OFAC SDN) and to the network of sanctioned individual Emily Liu | OFAC SDN designation review (E.O. 13224/13382); BIS Entity List restricts future exports only, no asset freeze |
| Beijing Plenary Technology Co., Ltd.Entered August 10, 2026 | China | BIS Entity List addition; Federal Register 90 FR, Doc. 2025-19508, eff./publ. October 9, 2025 | Provided/attempted to provide support to procurement networks supplying U.S.-origin electronic components later found in weaponized UAVs operated by Iranian proxies (incl. Houthi militants); network tied to Iran MODAFL-controlled Shiraz Electronics Industries (SEI, existing OFAC SDN) and to the network of sanctioned individual Emily Liu | OFAC SDN designation review (E.O. 13224/13382); BIS Entity List restricts future exports only, no asset freeze |
| Beijing Rageflight Technology Co., Ltd.Entered August 10, 2026 | China | BIS Entity List addition; Federal Register 90 FR, Doc. 2025-19508, eff./publ. October 9, 2025 | Provided/attempted to provide support to procurement networks supplying U.S.-origin electronic components later found in weaponized UAVs operated by Iranian proxies (incl. Houthi militants); network tied to Iran MODAFL-controlled Shiraz Electronics Industries (SEI, existing OFAC SDN) and to the network of sanctioned individual Emily Liu | OFAC SDN designation review (E.O. 13224/13382); BIS Entity List restricts future exports only, no asset freeze |
| Business Metal Sanayi Ve Dış Ticaret Ltd. Şti.Entered August 10, 2026 | Turkey | BIS Entity List addition; Federal Register 90 FR, Doc. 2025-19508, eff./publ. October 9, 2025 | Diverted U.S.-origin items to Iran, including items classified under ECCN 2B350 (chemical-manufacturing equipment, Australia Group proliferation-risk control); several linked to transshipping components for Iran's HESA aerospace/defense concern or to parties already on the BIS Entity List/OFAC SDN list | OFAC SDN designation review (E.O. 13224/13382); BIS Entity List restricts future exports only, no asset freeze |
| DBC Makina Sanayi ve Ticaret A.Ş.Entered August 10, 2026 | Turkey | BIS Entity List addition; Federal Register 90 FR, Doc. 2025-19508, eff./publ. October 9, 2025 | Diverted U.S.-origin items to Iran, including items classified under ECCN 2B350 (chemical-manufacturing equipment, Australia Group proliferation-risk control); several linked to transshipping components for Iran's HESA aerospace/defense concern or to parties already on the BIS Entity List/OFAC SDN list | OFAC SDN designation review (E.O. 13224/13382); BIS Entity List restricts future exports only, no asset freeze |
| Easy Fly Intelligent Technology Co., LtdEntered August 10, 2026 | China | BIS Entity List addition; Federal Register 90 FR, Doc. 2025-19508, eff./publ. October 9, 2025 | Provided/attempted to provide support to procurement networks supplying U.S.-origin electronic components later found in weaponized UAVs operated by Iranian proxies (incl. Houthi militants); network tied to Iran MODAFL-controlled Shiraz Electronics Industries (SEI, existing OFAC SDN) and to the network of sanctioned individual Emily Liu | OFAC SDN designation review (E.O. 13224/13382); BIS Entity List restricts future exports only, no asset freeze |
| Erçetin İş Makinaları Yedek Parçaları İnşaat Ve Dış Ticaret Ltd. Şti.Entered August 10, 2026 | Turkey | BIS Entity List addition; Federal Register 90 FR, Doc. 2025-19508, eff./publ. October 9, 2025 | Diverted U.S.-origin items to Iran, including items classified under ECCN 2B350 (chemical-manufacturing equipment, Australia Group proliferation-risk control); several linked to transshipping components for Iran's HESA aerospace/defense concern or to parties already on the BIS Entity List/OFAC SDN list | OFAC SDN designation review (E.O. 13224/13382); BIS Entity List restricts future exports only, no asset freeze |
| Feng Bao Electronic Information Technology (Shanghai) Co., Ltd.Entered August 10, 2026 | China | BIS Entity List addition; Federal Register 90 FR, Doc. 2025-19508, eff./publ. October 9, 2025 | Provided/attempted to provide support to procurement networks supplying U.S.-origin electronic components later found in weaponized UAVs operated by Iranian proxies (incl. Houthi militants); network tied to Iran MODAFL-controlled Shiraz Electronics Industries (SEI, existing OFAC SDN) and to the network of sanctioned individual Emily Liu | OFAC SDN designation review (E.O. 13224/13382); BIS Entity List restricts future exports only, no asset freeze |
| Feng Bao Trading Hong Kong LtdEntered August 10, 2026 | Hong Kong | BIS Entity List addition; Federal Register 90 FR, Doc. 2025-19508, eff./publ. October 9, 2025 | Provided/attempted to provide support to procurement networks supplying U.S.-origin electronic components later found in weaponized UAVs operated by Iranian proxies (incl. Houthi militants); network tied to Iran MODAFL-controlled Shiraz Electronics Industries (SEI, existing OFAC SDN) and to the network of sanctioned individual Emily Liu | OFAC SDN designation review (E.O. 13224/13382); BIS Entity List restricts future exports only, no asset freeze |
| Gansu Shuili Hoisting Equipment Co., Ltd.Entered August 10, 2026 | China | BIS Entity List addition; Federal Register 90 FR, Doc. 2025-19508, eff./publ. October 9, 2025 | Provided/attempted to provide support to procurement networks supplying U.S.-origin electronic components later found in weaponized UAVs operated by Iranian proxies (incl. Houthi militants); network tied to Iran MODAFL-controlled Shiraz Electronics Industries (SEI, existing OFAC SDN) and to the network of sanctioned individual Emily Liu | OFAC SDN designation review (E.O. 13224/13382); BIS Entity List restricts future exports only, no asset freeze |
| Goodview GlobalEntered August 10, 2026 | China | BIS Entity List addition; Federal Register 90 FR, Doc. 2025-19508, eff./publ. October 9, 2025 | Provided/attempted to provide support to procurement networks supplying U.S.-origin electronic components later found in weaponized UAVs operated by Iranian proxies (incl. Houthi militants); network tied to Iran MODAFL-controlled Shiraz Electronics Industries (SEI, existing OFAC SDN) and to the network of sanctioned individual Emily Liu, described by BIS/Treasury as part of an illicit procurement network supplying IRGC-Qods Force front companies | OFAC SDN designation review (E.O. 13224/13382); BIS Entity List restricts future exports only, no asset freeze |
| Jinan Xin Yin Bo Electronic Equipment Co., Ltd.Entered August 10, 2026 | China | BIS Entity List addition; Federal Register 90 FR, Doc. 2025-19508, eff./publ. October 9, 2025 | Provided/attempted to provide support to procurement networks supplying U.S.-origin electronic components later found in weaponized UAVs operated by Iranian proxies (incl. Houthi militants); network tied to Iran MODAFL-controlled Shiraz Electronics Industries (SEI, existing OFAC SDN) and to the network of sanctioned individual Emily Liu | OFAC SDN designation review (E.O. 13224/13382); BIS Entity List restricts future exports only, no asset freeze |
| PMR Teknik Makine Ticaret Ltd. Şti.Entered August 10, 2026 | Turkey | BIS Entity List addition; Federal Register 90 FR, Doc. 2025-19508, eff./publ. October 9, 2025 | Diverted U.S.-origin items to Iran, including items classified under ECCN 2B350 (chemical-manufacturing equipment, Australia Group proliferation-risk control); several linked to transshipping components for Iran's HESA aerospace/defense concern or to parties already on the BIS Entity List/OFAC SDN list | OFAC SDN designation review (E.O. 13224/13382); BIS Entity List restricts future exports only, no asset freeze |
| Royal Impact Trading L.L.C.Entered August 10, 2026 | UAE (Dubai) | BIS Entity List addition; Federal Register 90 FR, Doc. 2025-19508, eff./publ. October 9, 2025 | Diverted U.S.-origin items to Iran, including items classified under ECCN 2B350 (chemical-manufacturing equipment, Australia Group proliferation-risk control); several linked to transshipping components for Iran's HESA aerospace/defense concern or to parties already on the BIS Entity List/OFAC SDN list | OFAC SDN designation review (E.O. 13224/13382); BIS Entity List restricts future exports only, no asset freeze |
| Schmidt & Co., (HK) Ltd.Entered August 10, 2026 | Hong Kong | BIS Entity List addition; Federal Register 90 FR, Doc. 2025-19508, eff./publ. October 9, 2025 | Provided/attempted to provide support to procurement networks supplying U.S.-origin electronic components later found in weaponized UAVs operated by Iranian proxies (incl. Houthi militants); network tied to Iran MODAFL-controlled Shiraz Electronics Industries (SEI, existing OFAC SDN) and to the network of sanctioned individual Emily Liu | OFAC SDN designation review (E.O. 13224/13382); BIS Entity List restricts future exports only, no asset freeze |
| Shandong Xin Yin Bo IOT Technology Co., Ltd.Entered August 10, 2026 | China | BIS Entity List addition; Federal Register 90 FR, Doc. 2025-19508, eff./publ. October 9, 2025 | Provided/attempted to provide support to procurement networks supplying U.S.-origin electronic components later found in weaponized UAVs operated by Iranian proxies (incl. Houthi militants); network tied to Iran MODAFL-controlled Shiraz Electronics Industries (SEI, existing OFAC SDN) and to the network of sanctioned individual Emily Liu | OFAC SDN designation review (E.O. 13224/13382); BIS Entity List restricts future exports only, no asset freeze |
| Shanghai Bitconn Electronics Co., Ltd.Entered August 10, 2026 | China | BIS Entity List addition; Federal Register 90 FR, Doc. 2025-19508, eff./publ. October 9, 2025 | Provided/attempted to provide support to procurement networks supplying U.S.-origin electronic components later found in weaponized UAVs operated by Iranian proxies (incl. Houthi militants); network tied to Iran MODAFL-controlled Shiraz Electronics Industries (SEI, existing OFAC SDN) and to the network of sanctioned individual Emily Liu | OFAC SDN designation review (E.O. 13224/13382); BIS Entity List restricts future exports only, no asset freeze |
| Shanghai Langqing Electronic Technology Co.Entered August 10, 2026 | China | BIS Entity List addition; Federal Register 90 FR, Doc. 2025-19508, eff./publ. October 9, 2025 | Provided/attempted to provide support to procurement networks supplying U.S.-origin electronic components later found in weaponized UAVs operated by Iranian proxies (incl. Houthi militants); network tied to Iran MODAFL-controlled Shiraz Electronics Industries (SEI, existing OFAC SDN) and to the network of sanctioned individual Emily Liu | OFAC SDN designation review (E.O. 13224/13382); BIS Entity List restricts future exports only, no asset freeze |
| Shanghai Sisheng Power Control Technology Co., Ltd.Entered August 10, 2026 | China | BIS Entity List addition; Federal Register 90 FR, Doc. 2025-19508, eff./publ. October 9, 2025 | Provided/attempted to provide support to procurement networks supplying U.S.-origin electronic components later found in weaponized UAVs operated by Iranian proxies (incl. Houthi militants); network tied to Iran MODAFL-controlled Shiraz Electronics Industries (SEI, existing OFAC SDN) and to the network of sanctioned individual Emily Liu | OFAC SDN designation review (E.O. 13224/13382); BIS Entity List restricts future exports only, no asset freeze |
| Sisdoz Aritma Ve Pompa Teknolojileri Sanayi Ticaret A.Ş.Entered August 10, 2026 | Turkey | BIS Entity List addition; Federal Register 90 FR, Doc. 2025-19508, eff./publ. October 9, 2025 | Diverted U.S.-origin items to Iran, including items classified under ECCN 2B350 (chemical-manufacturing equipment, Australia Group proliferation-risk control); several linked to transshipping components for Iran's HESA aerospace/defense concern or to parties already on the BIS Entity List/OFAC SDN list | OFAC SDN designation review (E.O. 13224/13382); BIS Entity List restricts future exports only, no asset freeze |
| UMS Ankara Kalibrasyon Mühendislik Müşavirlik Mümessillik Sanayi Ve Ticaret Ltd. Şti.Entered August 10, 2026 | Turkey | BIS Entity List addition; Federal Register 90 FR, Doc. 2025-19508, eff./publ. October 9, 2025 | Diverted U.S.-origin items to Iran, including items classified under ECCN 2B350 (chemical-manufacturing equipment, Australia Group proliferation-risk control); several linked to transshipping components for Iran's HESA aerospace/defense concern or to parties already on the BIS Entity List/OFAC SDN list | OFAC SDN designation review (E.O. 13224/13382); BIS Entity List restricts future exports only, no asset freeze |
| Yant İnşaat Gıda Turizm Sanayi Dış Ticaret Ltd. Şti.Entered August 10, 2026 | Turkey | BIS Entity List addition; Federal Register 90 FR, Doc. 2025-19508, eff./publ. October 9, 2025 | Diverted U.S.-origin items to Iran, including items classified under ECCN 2B350 (chemical-manufacturing equipment, Australia Group proliferation-risk control); several linked to transshipping components for Iran's HESA aerospace/defense concern or to parties already on the BIS Entity List/OFAC SDN list | OFAC SDN designation review (E.O. 13224/13382); BIS Entity List restricts future exports only, no asset freeze |
Register B · Gated Seeds (43)
Undesignated parties documented through this project’s entity investigations, cleared for publication under both gates.
Showing 43 of 43 entries
| Name | Cluster | Connection | Evidence | Tier | The Ask |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bank Tejarat; Bank Mellat; Bank Pasargad (as Contract Counterparties of the Designated Exchange House)Entered August 10, 2026 | Oil & Shadow Fleet | Held contracts with the Mehrdad Geramian Nik and Partners exchange house, which was holding tens of millions of dollars in early 2026 | Named by Treasury as the exchange house's banking counterparties in the June 5 action | T3 | Phase 3: verify connection strength and evaluate for future designation packages. |
| Basir Electro-Robot CoEntered August 10, 2026 | Crackdown Perpetrators | Surveillance and armed-drone manufacturer, Tehran | Border observation and firing system; surveillance and assault micro aerial vehicles shown at IPAS 2017 | T4 | Phase 3: verify connection strength and evaluate for future designation packages. |
| Basrah Gas CompanyEntered August 10, 2026 | Oil & Shadow Fleet | Its terminal (Khor Al Zubair) was used as a false load port on Iranian LPG documents | Managing Director Andrew Wiper confirmed the G YMM (IMO 9139696) never loaded from BGC, identifies BGC as a spoofing victim and a documentary-verification chokepoint | T4-adj | Phase 3: verify connection strength and evaluate for future designation packages. |
| Birch Ventures LimitedEntered August 10, 2026 | Financial & Crypto | Ali Ansari's UK property-holding vehicle | Companies House records show Ansari controls it; UK property data show it owns 12 properties on Bishops Avenue, north London; *Private Eye* identified the "Cypriot" Ali Ansari in filings as the Iranian businessman. Returns no match on the UK Sanctions List. | T3 | Phase 3: verify connection strength and evaluate for future designation packages. |
| BPEntered August 10, 2026 | Oil & Shadow Fleet | Reported buyer of Milavous-blended crude, per a single source; carried here as a compliance-exposure flag. | Named as a Milavous customer | T4 | Phase 3: verify connection strength and evaluate for future designation packages. |
| Central Insurance of the Islamic Republic of IranEntered August 10, 2026 | Oil & Shadow Fleet | Established the designated Persian Gulf Marine Insurance Company | Named by Treasury as PGMIC's founder in the July 29 action, but not itself designated in that action | T3 | Phase 3: verify connection strength and evaluate for future designation packages. |
| Century Sustainable Structures CompanyEntered August 10, 2026 | Crackdown Perpetrators | FARAJA Cooperative Foundation subsidiary | Roughly 100 subsidiaries, 60 in Tehran; built much of the Mehr housing programme | T4-adj | Phase 3: verify connection strength and evaluate for future designation packages. |
| ChevronEntered August 10, 2026 | Oil & Shadow Fleet | Reported buyer of Milavous-blended crude, per a single source; carried here as a compliance-exposure flag rather than a designation candidate. | Named as a Milavous customer | T4 | Phase 3: verify connection strength and evaluate for future designation packages. |
| Dalian Changxing International TradeEntered August 10, 2026 | Oil & Shadow Fleet | Took 95% control of the Singapore trading unit immediately after the designation; linked to a local Chinese governmental body per Qichacha | Direct beneficiary of a post-designation ownership transfer, textbook successor-entity risk | T4 | Phase 3: verify connection strength and evaluate for future designation packages. |
| Dalian Eagle Sky Industries (China)Entered August 10, 2026 | Crackdown Perpetrators | Anti-riot vehicle manufacturer | DES-516B vehicles imported through Bandar Abbas in late 2010; no designation stated | T4 | Phase 3: verify connection strength and evaluate for future designation packages. |
| Faragostar Persia Electronics CoEntered August 10, 2026 | Crackdown Perpetrators | Sold Dahua CCTV to the Interior Ministry | 2020 sale to Iran's Interior Ministry | T4 | Phase 3: verify connection strength and evaluate for future designation packages. |
| Geedge NetworksEntered August 10, 2026 | Crackdown Perpetrators | Offers "middleboxes" that intercept data on network cables | No Iranian recipient stated in the source; sold advanced censorship systems to Kazakhstan, Pakistan, Myanmar and Ethiopia | T4 | Phase 3: verify connection strength and evaluate for future designation packages. |
| Hengli Petrochemical InternationalEntered August 10, 2026 | Oil & Shadow Fleet | Group trading arm; previously wholly owned by the designated refining entity | Ownership restructured post-designation; now 95% Dalian Changxing International Trade / 5% refining entity; trades crude and petrochemical derivatives plus some physical refined fuels | T4 | Phase 3: verify connection strength and evaluate for future designation packages. |
| HikvisionEntered August 10, 2026 | Crackdown Perpetrators | Camera manufacturer whose surveillance equipment was acquired by Iranian authorities | Spokesperson said the company had not supplied Iran for "eight years"; the source does not state it is sanctioned | T4 | Phase 3: verify connection strength and evaluate for future designation packages. |
| HuaweiEntered August 10, 2026 | Crackdown Perpetrators | Supplied internet-filtering and deep-packet-inspection technologies to Iranian authorities | The source does not state it is sanctioned | T4 | Phase 3: verify connection strength and evaluate for future designation packages. |
| Iran Mall Development CompanyEntered August 10, 2026 | Financial & Crypto | Wholly-owned Ayandeh Bank borrower at the centre of the Ansari lending fraud | ~70% of Ayandeh's lending went to it, in loans exceeding the single-borrower legal limit by >1,000× | T4 | Phase 3: verify connection strength and evaluate for future designation packages. |
| Iran NotrikaEntered August 10, 2026 | Crackdown Perpetrators | Surveillance manufacturer/supplier | Supplies video-surveillance equipment to Iranian government agencies | T4 | Phase 3: verify connection strength and evaluate for future designation packages. |
| Islamic Republic of Iran RailwaysEntered August 10, 2026 | Oil & Shadow Fleet | Counterparty to DotOne Rail's ~$800m April 2025 contract | Named by Treasury as the contracting party financing the Zanjani group's domestic settlement leg; not designated in the July 24 action | T3 | Phase 3: verify connection strength and evaluate for future designation packages. |
| Jino Motors (South Korea)Entered August 10, 2026 | Crackdown Perpetrators | Water-cannon and armoured-vehicle manufacturer listing the Iranian National Police among its customers | 2013 report; JRC-6500 resembles a vehicle used by Iranian riot police; no designation stated | T4 | Phase 3: verify connection strength and evaluate for future designation packages. |
| JPMorganEntered August 10, 2026 | Oil & Shadow Fleet | Treasury probed the bank's ties to the Shamkhani-linked Ocean Leonid fund in November 2024, per a single source. | Financial-channel exposure, not a designation candidate | T4 | Phase 3: verify connection strength and evaluate for future designation packages. |
| KamaEntered August 10, 2026 | Crackdown Perpetrators | Intermediary that sold NtechLab's FindFace to Iranian entities | Clients include the IRGC and the Ministry of Intelligence; contracts 2020 to 2022 | T3 | Phase 3: verify connection strength and evaluate for future designation packages. |
| Laleh Computer CompanyEntered August 10, 2026 | Crackdown Perpetrators | FARAJA Cooperative Foundation subsidiary | Supplies smart cards to ten banks | T4-adj | Phase 3: verify connection strength and evaluate for future designation packages. |
| Marine Installations CompanyEntered August 10, 2026 | Crackdown Perpetrators | FARAJA Cooperative Foundation acquired more than 80% in 2009 and 2010 | Named as a foundation acquisition | T4-adj | Phase 3: verify connection strength and evaluate for future designation packages. |
| Mehragan Investment CompanyEntered August 10, 2026 | Crackdown Perpetrators | FARAJA Cooperative Foundation is a major shareholder | Named as a foundation holding | T4-adj | Phase 3: verify connection strength and evaluate for future designation packages. |
| Mobile Communications of Iran (MCI / Hamrah-e Aval)Entered August 10, 2026 | Crackdown Perpetrators | State mobile operator that implemented the shutdown | Recorded IRT 700bn (~$22m) revenue decline, 21.8% month-on-month, during the blackout; AS197207 | T1 | Close residual peer gaps. |
| Moj-e Nasr Gostar Telecommunications and ElectronicsEntered August 10, 2026 | Crackdown Perpetrators | Bonyad Taavon Sepah subsidiary | Data centres, CCTV installation, telecom towers | T4 | Phase 3: verify connection strength and evaluate for future designation packages. |
| Naji Amin Supervision CompanyEntered August 10, 2026 | Crackdown Perpetrators | FARAJA Cooperative Foundation subsidiary | Listed among foundation companies | T4-adj | Phase 3: verify connection strength and evaluate for future designation packages. |
| Najm Khavarmianeh (Najm Middle East) Chain Stores CompanyEntered August 10, 2026 | Crackdown Perpetrators | Periodic Naji Pas board representative | Consumer goods and credit cards for FARAJA personnel | T4 | Phase 3: verify connection strength and evaluate for future designation packages. |
| Pars Ertebat Afzar CoEntered August 10, 2026 | Crackdown Perpetrators | Surveillance-equipment supplier | Contractual partner of Tiandy's Iranian representative | T4 | Phase 3: verify connection strength and evaluate for future designation packages. |
| Persia System CoEntered August 10, 2026 | Crackdown Perpetrators | Surveillance supplier | Numerous contracts with government agencies and ministries; regular IPAS participant | T4 | Phase 3: verify connection strength and evaluate for future designation packages. |
| Pooyan MokhtariEntered August 10, 2026 | Financial & Crypto | Same gambling-promotion role | Convicted in absentia in Iran in 2023 with Sobhani and Kayvanpour; denies IRGC links and says he is unfamiliar with Shelbit. Not on the August 7, 2026 SDN additions. Reported by a single source; no second outlet has corroborated it. | T3 | Phase 3: verify connection strength and evaluate for future designation packages. |
| Qingdao Haiye Oil Terminal Co., Ltd., Counterparty Teapot RefineriesEntered August 10, 2026 | Financial & Crypto | Terminal designated May 1, 2026; the teapot refinery buyers it serves are largely not designated | Designated under E.O. 13846 with director Li Xinchun; OFAC issued a companion alert on the sanctions risk of dealing with teapot refineries, implying an undesignated buyer population | T3 | Phase 3: verify connection strength and evaluate for future designation packages. |
| RahgoshEntered August 10, 2026 | Crackdown Perpetrators | FARAJA Cooperative Foundation subsidiary | Traffic Police contractor | T4-adj | Phase 3: verify connection strength and evaluate for future designation packages. |
| Sasha SobhaniEntered August 10, 2026 | Financial & Crypto | Promoter of the >2,000-site Persian gambling network that Shelbit serviced | Convicted in absentia in Iran in 2023 with Mokhtari and Kayvanpour over illegal gambling; denies money laundering, sanctions evasion or terrorism financing. Not on the August 7, 2026 SDN additions. Reported via a single, Reuters-derived secondary account; no second outlet has corroborated it. | T3 | Phase 3: verify connection strength and evaluate for future designation packages. |
| Supreme National Security CouncilEntered August 10, 2026 | Crackdown Perpetrators | Reported as the body that issued the January 8 shutdown order | IRGC-owned Tasnim reporting, relayed by National Security News, is the sole account of this decision; the ICT Ministry attributed it to "the competent security authorities." | T4 | Phase 3: verify connection strength and evaluate for future designation packages. |
| Tartan Dezh Ariana CoEntered August 10, 2026 | Crackdown Perpetrators | Video-surveillance supplier | Supplies Dahua, Tiandy, HikVision and HiLook equipment to Sharif University, IUST and Tehran city government | T4 | Phase 3: verify connection strength and evaluate for future designation packages. |
| Tavan Sarmayeh Pouya / Tavan Pouya InvestmentEntered August 10, 2026 | Crackdown Perpetrators | Naji Pas board member | Holding-company activities in energy and investment within the FARAJA corporate network | T4 | Phase 3: verify connection strength and evaluate for future designation packages. |
| Telecommunication Company of Iran (TCI)Entered August 10, 2026 | Crackdown Perpetrators | 51% acquired by the IRGC-linked consortium in 2009; the fixed-line backbone across which the shutdown ran | 2009 US$8bn acquisition; no designation found in any jurisdiction | T4 | Close residual peer gaps. |
| The ~10 Dubai LPG Companies Sharing One Office (Names Not Published)Entered August 10, 2026 | Oil & Shadow Fleet | Channel for roughly a quarter of Bangladesh's LPG imports, sourced from Iran at $40 to 50/t below market | Structural front-company cluster identified by trade reporting; individual names not published | T4-adj | Phase 3: verify connection strength and evaluate for future designation packages. |
| Tiandy TechnologiesEntered August 10, 2026 | Crackdown Perpetrators | Supplies surveillance equipment to Revolutionary Guard branches and Iran's military forces | Markets facial-recognition tools; "tiger chairs" reported in use during the November 2019 protests; the source does not state it is sanctioned | T4 | Phase 3: verify connection strength and evaluate for future designation packages. |
| Unnamed Banks in China, Hong Kong, the UAE and OmanEntered August 10, 2026 | Oil & Shadow Fleet | Treasury sent warning letters over the Hengli/Iran oil trade | Explicit official warning short of designation, a stated pipeline of future targets | T3 | Phase 3: verify connection strength and evaluate for future designation packages. |
| Unnamed U.S. Freight Forwarders / Warehouse Operators Used by the Sorena NetworkEntered August 10, 2026 | Weapons & Procurement | Saeid Zahedi paid freight forwarders and warehouses from a U.S. financial account to consolidate and reship goods; none is named or designated | Iran International summary of the Treasury action | T4 | Phase 3: verify connection strength and evaluate for future designation packages. |
| ZTEEntered August 10, 2026 | Crackdown Perpetrators | Supplied internet-filtering and DPI technologies; confirmed it halted operations in Iran in 2016 | The source does not state it is sanctioned | T4 | Phase 3: verify connection strength and evaluate for future designation packages. |
Adopting the Screen
The screen is published so it can be used. Compliance desks, pension boards and procurement offices may adopt it as-is. A jurisdiction’s failure to designate a party on this list is not evidence the party is clean; it is the gap this record exists to document.