Latest : GOV/2026/50 repeats the June 13, 2025 estimate; the Agency still lacks access to the affected sites.
The IAEA reports Iran's enriched uranium stockpile to its Board of Governors each quarter. Figures below are kilograms of uranium as the Agency states them, with the centrifuge cascades it verified and, since the June 2025 strikes, its own words on what it can and cannot verify. Checked against iaea.org on October 13, 2026.
- Last IAEA estimate, all forms9,874.9 kg
- Up to 60% U-235440.9 kg
- Reports in this series11
- Latest report checkedGOV/2026/50
Uranium enriched up to 60% rose from 87.5 kg to 440.9 kg between February 12, 2023, and June 13, 2025
- Up to 2% U-235
- Up to 5% U-235
- Up to 20% U-235
- Up to 60% U-235
| Report | Stockpile as of | Total, all forms | In UF6 form | Up to 2% | Up to 5% | Up to 20% | Up to 60% |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| GOV/2023/8 | February 12, 2023 | 3,760.8 | 3,402.0 | 1,555.3 | 1,324.5 | 434.7 | 87.5 |
| GOV/2023/24 | May 13, 2023 | 4,744.5 | 4,384.8 | 2,459.6 | 1,340.2 | 470.9 | 114.1 |
| GOV/2023/39 | August 19, 2023 | 3,795.5 | 3,441.3 | 833.0 | 1,950.9 | 535.8 | 121.6 |
| GOV/2023/57 | October 28, 2023 | 4,486.8 | 4,130.7 | 1,217.2 | 2,218.1 | 567.1 | 128.3 |
| GOV/2024/7 | February 10, 2024 | 5,525.5 | 5,164.5 | 1,934.0 | 2,396.8 | 712.2 | 121.5 |
| GOV/2024/26 | May 11, 2024 | 6,201.3 | 5,841.3 | 2,571.0 | 2,376.9 | 751.3 | 142.1 |
| GOV/2024/41 | August 17, 2024 | 5,751.8 | 4,951.1 | 1,651.0 | 2,321.5 | 813.9 | 164.7 |
| GOV/2024/61 | October 26, 2024 | 6,604.4 | 5,807.2 | 2,190.9 | 2,594.8 | 839.2 | 182.3 |
| GOV/2025/8 | February 8, 2025 | 8,294.4 | 7,464.0 | 2,927.0 | 3,655.4 | 606.8 | 274.8 |
| GOV/2025/24 | May 17, 2025 | 9,247.6 | 8,413.3 | 2,221.4 | 5,508.8 | 274.5 | 408.6 |
| GOV/2025/50 | June 13, 2025 | 9,874.9 | 9,040.5 | 2,391.1 | 6,024.4 | 184.1 | 440.9 |
Mass is uranium mass, not UF6 mass. The enrichment-level columns break down the UF6-form figure; the total also counts uranium in other chemical forms. For scale, the Agency notes: "The quantity of 300 kg of UF6 corresponds to 202.8 kg of uranium." (GOV/2023/8). Each total matches the change the next report states against it; no report in this series has revised an earlier total. Where a later report revises a figure, both values will appear here with their dates.
The June 13, 2025 estimate is restated without change in GOV/2025/65, GOV/2026/8, GOV/2026/33 and GOV/2026/50.
Centrifuge Cascades the Agency Verified
The Agency's wording, quoted from each report, for the Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP) at Natanz and for the cascades producing uranium enriched up to 60% at the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant (FFEP).
| Report | FEP (Natanz), up to 5% | FFEP (Fordow), up to 60% |
|---|---|---|
| GOV/2023/8 | "the Agency verified at FEP that 36 IR-1 cascades, eight IR-2m cascades, three IR-4 cascades and three IR-6 cascades were being fed with natural UF6 to produce UF6 enriched up to 5% U-235" | Not stated in this form |
| GOV/2023/24 | "the Agency verified at FEP that 36 IR-1 cascades, nine IR-2m cascades, two IR-4 cascades and three IR-6 cascades were being fed with natural UF6 to produce UF6 enriched up to 5% U-235" | Not stated in this form |
| GOV/2023/39 | "the Agency verified at FEP that 36 IR-1 cascades, eight IR-2m cascades, three IR-4 cascades and three IR-6 cascades were being fed with natural UF6 to produce UF6 enriched up to 5% U-235" | Not stated in this form |
| GOV/2023/57 | "the Agency verified at FEP that 36 IR-1 cascades, 9 IR-2m cascades, 3 IR-4 cascades and 3 IR-6 cascades were being fed with natural UF6 to produce UF6 enriched up to 5% U-235" | "the Agency verified at FFEP in Unit 2 that Iran was continuing to feed UF6 enriched up to 5% U-235 into: up to 1044 IR-1 centrifuges in three sets of two interconnected cascades to enrich UF6 up to 20% U-235; and into one set of two interconnected cascades of 166 IR-6 centrifuges to enrich UF6 up to 60% U-235" |
| GOV/2024/7 | "the Agency verified at FEP that 35 IR-1 cascades, 9 IR-2m cascades, 3 IR-4 cascades and 3 IR-6 cascades were being fed with natural UF6 to produce UF6 enriched up to 5% U-235" | "the Agency verified at FFEP in Unit 2 that Iran was continuing to feed UF6 enriched up to 5% U-235 into: up to 1044 IR-1 centrifuges in three sets of two interconnected cascades to enrich UF6 up to 20% U-235; and into one set of two interconnected cascades of 166 IR-6 centrifuges to enrich UF6 up to 60% U-235" |
| GOV/2024/26 | "the Agency verified at FEP that 35 IR-1 cascades, 5 IR-2m cascades, 3 IR-4 cascades and 3 IR-6 cascades were being fed with natural UF6 to produce UF6 enriched up to 5% U-235" | "the Agency verified at FFEP in Unit 2 that Iran was continuing to feed UF6 enriched up to 5% U-235 into: up to 1044 IR-1 centrifuges in three sets of two interconnected cascades to enrich UF6 up to 20% U-235; and into one set of two interconnected cascades of 166 IR-6 centrifuges to enrich UF6 up to 60% U-235" |
| GOV/2024/41 | "the Agency verified at FEP that 36 IR-1 cascades, 15 IR-2m cascades, 12 IR-4 cascades and 3 IR-6 cascades were being fed with natural UF6 to produce UF6 enriched up to 5% U-235" | "the Agency verified at FFEP in Unit 2 that Iran was continuing to feed UF6 enriched up to 5% U-235: into up to 1044 IR-1 centrifuges in three sets of two interconnected cascades to enrich UF6 up to 20% U-235; and into 332 IR-6 centrifuges in one set of two interconnected cascades to enrich UF6 up to 60% U-235" |
| GOV/2024/61 | "the Agency verified at FEP that 36 IR-1 cascades, 15 IR-2m cascades, 12 IR-4 cascades and 3 IR-6 cascades were being fed with natural UF6 to produce UF6 enriched up to 5% U-235" | "the Agency verified at FFEP in Unit 2 that Iran was continuing to feed UF6 enriched up to 5% U-235: into up to 1044 IR-1 centrifuges in three sets of two interconnected cascades to enrich UF6 up to 20% U-235; and into 335 IR-6 centrifuges in one set of two interconnected cascades to enrich UF6 up to 60% U-235" |
| GOV/2025/8 | "the Agency verified at FEP that 36 IR-1 cascades, 27 IR-2m cascades, 12 IR-4 cascades and 3 IR-6 cascades were being fed with natural UF6 to produce UF6 enriched up to 5% U-235" | "the Agency verified at FFEP in Unit 2 that Iran was feeding: UF6 enriched up to 5% U-235 into up to 1044 IR-1 centrifuges in three sets of two interconnected cascades to enrich UF6 up to 20% U-235; UF6 enriched up to 20% U-235 into up to 350 IR-6 centrifuges in one set of two interconnected cascades to enrich UF6 up to 60% U-235" |
| GOV/2025/24 | "the Agency verified at FEP that 36 IR-1 cascades, 31 IR-2m cascades, 12 IR-4 cascades and 3 IR-6 cascades were being fed with natural UF6 to produce UF6 enriched up to 5% U-235" | "the Agency verified at FFEP in Unit 2 that Iran was feeding: UF6 enriched up to 5% U-235 into up to 1044 IR-1 centrifuges in three sets of two interconnected cascades to enrich UF6 up to 20% U-235; UF6 enriched up to 20% U-235 into up to 350 IR-6 centrifuges in one set of two interconnected cascades to enrich UF6 up to 60% U-235" |
After June 2025: What the IAEA Can and Cannot Verify
Since the military attacks of June 13 to 24, 2025, the Agency has not had access to the affected enrichment and conversion facilities. Its reports since then repeat the June 13, 2025 estimate and state the limits of its knowledge. Quoted in each report's words, newest first.
GOV/2026/50, September 1, 2026
Cannot verify or has lost knowledge of
- "It is more than a year since the Agency lost continuity of knowledge in relation to the previously declared inventories of LEU and HEU enriched up to 60% U-235 at the declared nuclear facilities affected by the attacks of June 2025."
- "Due to the lack of access to Iran’s declared nuclear facilities, the Agency cannot verify: whether Iran has suspended all enrichment-related activities, including research and development; whether Iran has suspended all reprocessing activities; the size of Iran’s uranium stockpile; whether Iran has suspended work on all heavy water-related projects; and Iran’s inventories of centrifuges and related equipment."
- "The Agency is also concerned that Iran has not provided the Agency with access to its fourth declared enrichment facility (IFEP) since it was first declared by Iran in June 2025. Consequently, the Agency does not know its status for safeguards purposes or whether IFEP contains nuclear material."
Access and verification it reports
- "On 1-3 June 2026, the Agency conducted an inspection and DIV at the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant (BNPP) as part of its regular quarterly verification activity at this facility, as well as DIEs of recently updated DIQs for BNPP-1, BNPP-2, BNPP-3."
- "Iran confirmed that it would provide access and facilitate the Agency’s planned verification activities."
GOV/2026/33, June 4, 2026
Cannot verify or has lost knowledge of
- "Specifically, the Agency cannot verify: whether Iran has suspended all enrichment-related activities, including research and development; whether Iran has suspended all reprocessing activities; the size of Iran’s uranium stockpile; whether Iran has suspended work on all heavy water-related projects; Iran’s inventories of centrifuges and related equipment."
Access and verification it reports
- "On 1-3 June 2026, the Agency, with Iran’s cooperation, conducted an inspection and DIV at BNPP as part of its regular quarterly verification activity at this facility, as well as DIEs of recently updated DIQs for BNPP-1, BNPP-2, BNPP-3."
GOV/2026/8, February 27, 2026
Cannot verify or has lost knowledge of
- "Overall, the Agency cannot verify: whether Iran has suspended all enrichment-related activities, including research and development; whether Iran has suspended all reprocessing activities; the size of Iran’s uranium stockpile at the affected facilities; whether Iran has suspended work on all heavy water-related projects; Iran’s inventories of centrifuges and related equipment."
Access and verification it reports
- "As of the date of this report, Iran had provided access to the Agency to each of its unaffected nuclear facilities at least once since the military attacks of June 2025, with the exception of Karun Nuclear Power Plant (KNPP), which is in the early stages of construction and does not contain nuclear material."
GOV/2025/65, November 12, 2025
Cannot verify or has lost knowledge of
- "The Agency has lost continuity of knowledge in relation to the previously declared inventories of nuclear material in Iran at the affected facilities, including LEU and HEU."
Access and verification it reports
- "Subsequently, the Agency conducted three inspections/DIVs at the three facilities at BNPP and seven inspections/DIVs at four other unaffected facilities at the AEOI site in Tehran (TRR, PRF, MIX and JHL)."
GOV/2025/50, September 3, 2025
Cannot verify or has lost knowledge of
- "During this reporting period, the Agency lost continuity of knowledge in relation to the current inventories of nuclear material in Iran, including low enriched uranium (LEU) and high enriched uranium (HEU), which urgently needs to be addressed."
- "The Agency had already lost continuity of knowledge in relation to the production and current inventory of centrifuges, rotors and bellows, heavy water and UOC, which it will not be able to restore."
Access and verification it reports
- "Since 13 June 2025, the Agency has not received nuclear material accountancy reports and updated design information questionnaires (DIQs) and has not had access to any safeguarded nuclear facilities in Iran, with the exception of the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant (BNPP)."
How the Figures Are Sourced
- GOV/2023/8, IAEA Director General report to the Board of Governors, February 28, 2023
- GOV/2023/24, IAEA Director General report to the Board of Governors, May 31, 2023
- GOV/2023/39, IAEA Director General report to the Board of Governors, September 4, 2023
- GOV/2023/57, IAEA Director General report to the Board of Governors, November 15, 2023
- GOV/2024/7, IAEA Director General report to the Board of Governors, February 26, 2024
- GOV/2024/26, IAEA Director General report to the Board of Governors, May 27, 2024
- GOV/2024/41, IAEA Director General report to the Board of Governors, August 29, 2024
- GOV/2024/61, IAEA Director General report to the Board of Governors, November 19, 2024
- GOV/2025/8, IAEA Director General report to the Board of Governors, February 26, 2025
- GOV/2025/24, IAEA Director General report to the Board of Governors, May 31, 2025
- GOV/2025/50, IAEA Director General report to the Board of Governors, September 3, 2025
- GOV/2025/65, IAEA Director General report to the Board of Governors, November 12, 2025
- GOV/2026/8, IAEA Director General report to the Board of Governors, February 27, 2026
- GOV/2026/33, IAEA Director General report to the Board of Governors, June 4, 2026
- GOV/2026/50, IAEA Director General report to the Board of Governors, September 1, 2026
Coverage: every quarterly IAEA report from February 2023 (GOV/2023/8) to September 2026 (GOV/2026/50). Source type: the IAEA documents themselves, as published on iaea.org; no figure comes from press summaries. Definitions: "up to X%" is the Agency's category for uranium enriched to at most X% U-235; kg are kilograms of uranium mass. "As of" is the date the report gives for the estimate, which precedes the report date. Update cadence: checked after each IAEA Board report (quarterly) and when the Director General issues a statement on Iran; new reports go to editorial review before they appear here. Last checked: October 13, 2026.